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Abstract  
 
 
Much of the cooperation on criminal justice matters between the United Kingdom and 
the Republic of Ireland is based on EU level instruments. Whilst there has been 
consideration of the broader impact of Brexit on the Good Friday Agreement and 
consensus on the need to avoid a return to a hard border between Ireland and 
Northern Ireland, more detailed consideration has not been given to the effect that 
Brexit may have on continued criminal justice cooperation across the border. This 
article highlights the combined risks that Brexit presents for Northern Ireland in the 
form of increased criminality at a time when the loss of EU police cooperation 
mechanisms may result in a reduction of operational capacity and the removal of the 
legal architecture underpinning informal cooperation.  Part 1 seeks to highlight the 
historical context of UK-Irish cooperation in policing matters. Part 2 explores the risk 
that post Brexit the Irish border may become a focus for criminal activity. The risks 
relating to increased immigration crime, smuggling of commodities and potential rise 
in terrorist activities are explored. Part 3 considers how the risks of increased criminal 
threats are exacerbated by the loss of EU criminal justice cooperation mechanisms 
and how this will affect UK-Irish cooperation specifically. Consideration is particularly 
given to the loss of information sharing systems. Part 4 considers how loss of EU level 
cooperation mechanisms could be mitigated. The viability of bilateral agreements 
between the UK and Ireland is considered alongside ways which police cooperation 
can be formalised to compensate for the potential loss of EU criminal justice 
information sharing systems. Nordic police cooperation is considered as a potential 
blueprint for the UK and Ireland. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Brexit has presented many problems for the UK and the EU, amongst them is how to 
deal with the Irish border. The border will, after the end of the transition on 31 
December 2020, become an external land border between the EU and the UK. What 
that means for the citizens of the UK and Ireland will depend on the form of the new 
relationship that eventually emerges between the UK and Ireland.1 Whilst the loss of 
EU criminal justice cooperation made headlines from the time of the referendum the 
consequences for the Irish border and maintenance of criminal justice cooperation 
within the Common Travel Area have been largely ignored. In August 2016 the First 
 
1 Tim Wilson, ‘Prisoner Transfer within the Irish-UK Common Travel Area (CTA) after Brexit: human 
rights between politics and penal reform’, in this issue suggests that some aspects at least of the new 
relationship may evolve through intermittent readjustment over a considerable period of time. 
Minister and deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland wrote to the UK Prime Minister 
to set out their concerns surrounding the implications of Brexit for Northern Ireland. 
The letter set out a number of issues of particular significance which included the need 
to ensure that “criminal justice and crime-fighting are not compromised” and “that 
Brexit does not provide an incentive for those who wish to undermine the peace 
process.”2 With only months to go before the end of the transition period little has been 
done to address the concerns. Brexit inevitably meant a loss of some EU criminal 
justice cooperation mechanisms and a concomitant loss of operational effectiveness. 
This paper emanates from a research network funded by the AHRC. The UK-Irish 
Criminal Justice Cooperation Network began in 2018 and over a two year period 70 
practitioners and academic from Great Britain, Northern Ireland and Ireland 
generously gave of their time through a series of workshops to consider  the issues 
which are laid out in this paper. At the first event one practitioner commented that 
“everyone wants to keep the lights on, but we need to work out how to do it.” The 
impact of Brexit will be felt by all practitioners dealing with cross-border crime, even if 
a deal on criminal justice and security cooperation can be reached. However, the 
impacts for Ireland are more acute because of the existence of the Common Travel 
Area and the underlying political history which means the border, and the political 
decisions which determine how it is managed hold the potential for conflict. 
Consideration of the criminal justice risks and how they are best managed is therefore 
not just a legal question. This paper attempts to highlight why Brexit presents a risk to 
safety of the Common Travel Area and how the UK and Irish governments and the 
European Union can work to ensure ‘the lights stay on’. 
 
 
Part 1 – Historical context of cooperation between the UK and Ireland 
 
 
The Common Travel Area far pre-dates the founding of the European Union and can 
be traced to the Anglo-Irish Treaty negotiations of 19213  and the comparatively slow 
political process by which Ireland dismantled residual British constitutional ties.4 From 
the British perspective, Ireland post 1922 remained part of the Commonwealth and its 
citizens remained subjects of the British monarch with the same rights as British 
citizens. In 1948 Ireland declared itself a Republic and revoked any role for the British 
monarch. However, the Ireland Act 1949 declared that “notwithstanding that the 
Republic of Ireland is not part of His Majesty’s dominions, the Republic of Ireland is 
not a foreign country for the purposes of any law in force in any part of the United 
Kingdom”.5 Significantly, or perhaps ironically in the Brexit context, the first real sign 
 
2 Letter to the Prime Minister, The Rt Hon Theresa May MP from the First Minister and deputy First 
Minister of the Northern Ireland Executive, dated 10 August 2016 available at  
<https://www.executiveoffice-
ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/execoffice/Letter%20to%20PM%20from%20FM%20%26%20
dFM.pdf> accessed 03 November 2020 
3 The politics that gave rise to the CTA, its common citizenship rights and the geographical 
incoherence of the border are analysed in D. Ferriter, The Border: The Legacy of a Century of Anglo-
Irish Politics (Profile: London, 2019). 
4 T. Mohr, ‘The Privy Council appeal as a minority safeguard for the Protestant community of the Irish 
Free State, 1922-1935’ (2012) 63 NILQ 365-95 
5 Ireland Act 1981, s. 2 available at <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6/12-13-14/41> 
accessed 03 November 2020 
of the normalisation of UK-Irish international and economic relations was the Anglo-
Irish Trade Agreement of 1965.6   
 
Whilst a full recitation of the history of the CTA is not possible what we can see is that 
the term is shorthand for a much broader and more complex arrangement that is not 
limited to travel, but seeks to evade the problems stemming from a geographically, 
socially and economically incoherent border with, in one estimate, 208 crossing points. 
British and Irish citizens can move freely, without passport controls, and reside in 
either jurisdiction and enjoy associated rights and privileges, including the right to 
work, study and vote in certain elections and access to social welfare benefits and 
health services. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 8 May 2019 which 
reaffirmed the commitment of both Governments to the CTA post-Brexit.7 Whilst the 
UK and Ireland maintain separate immigration policies there has been a significant 
degree of practical cooperation and policy coordination in order to ensure the security 
of the CTA.8  
 
Ireland and the UK joined the European Community in 1973 and most aspects of the 
CTA were gradually overtaken by developments in EU law. The one significant 
exception was travel and border controls. With the advent of the Schengen area in 
1985 the UK was firmly opposed to joining the borderless region and Ireland could not 
contemplate jeopardising the CTA. Protocol 20 to the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) provides that the UK and Ireland “may continue to make 
arrangements between themselves relating to the movement of persons between their 
territories (‘the Common Travel Area’)”.9 This history is important as it reflects the 
common law mind set shared by  the UK and Ireland as opposed to the traditional 
continental approach to administration. Unlike Schengen which developed in an open 
and transparent way framed by supra national legislation and formal international 
instruments the CTA evolved over time with very little statutory underpinning and the 
absence of formal international agreements. Inevitably the close but informal 
cooperation in criminal matters enjoyed by the UK and ROI, framed by the CTA, 
became increasingly challenged as Irish criminal law diverged from British law through 
the 1960s and this worsened as a result of the Troubles in Northern Ireland.10 This 
process of divergence might have continued were it not for the role of the EU which 
became a driving force for convergence. This is reflected in a remarkable 
 
6 It is clear from UK Cabinet records that the Wilson Government made economic concessions to help 
put UK-Irish political relations on a better footing: R.l Donnelly, ‘Trade pact improved Anglo Irish 
relations’, Irish Times 2 January 1996 < https://www.irishtimes.com/news/trade-pact-improved-anglo-
irish-relations-1.18236 > accessed 03 November 2020. It even went so far as to volunteer that tariffs 
on Northern Irish cross-border trade could be lowered faster than for UK mainland exports to Ireland.  
7 For further information see <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/common-travel-area-
guidance> accessed 03 November 2020 
8 McGuinness, Gower and Wilkins, ‘The Common Travel Area, and the special status of Irish 
nationals in UK law’, House of Commons Briefing Paper No 7661, 16 October 2019 
9 Consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Protocol 20 on the application of 
certain aspects of Article 26 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to the United 
Kingdom and to Ireland. 
10 The difficulties with extradition between Ireland and the Northern Ireland are explored in Arnell and 
Davies, ‘Extradition Between the UK and Ireland After Brexit: Understanding the past and present to 
prepare for the future’ in this issue. 
transformation in Northern Ireland politics and society between the 1975 and 2015 
referendums11. 
 
 
Criminal justice has only been a devolved matter in Northern Ireland since 2010. This 
move was consistent with important changes made possible in Northern Ireland by the 
Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement (GFA) and as it emerged from direct rule by the UK 
Government during the Troubles. For example, the major structural reforms to policing 
in Northern Ireland with the replacement of the Royal Ulster Constabulary with the 
Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) in 2001. The priority here has been to embed 
an inclusive and community-based form of policing by consent, in which all parts of 
the still fractured Northern Ireland society have a stake. Change has had to be 
incremental. The history of civil conflict during the Troubles still casts its shadow and 
has impacted criminal justice developments. The Department of Justice once 
established tried to support policing by consent which sees the PSNI operating in an 
era less marked by their historic role in counterterrorism. Martin has demonstrated that 
‘policing in Northern Ireland has undergone one of the world’s most extensive human 
rights reform programmes.’12 Policing in Northern Ireland has subsequently focused 
on accountability and justice and the Northern Ireland Policing Board has a statutory 
duty to monitor the performance of the PSNI in complying with the Human Rights Act 
1998. Such a focus was a necessary part of the peace process as policing had been 
so bound up with community tensions following the independence of Ireland in 1921 
during which the RUC were seen as upholding the interests of unionists,13 who 
dominated the Stormont assembly and local government, within a system which 
resulted in discrimination against nationalists in particular and Catholics in general.14  
The GFA and the devolution of responsibilities for policing and justice to the Northern 
Ireland Executive marked an era of enhanced capacity for coordination in this area.  
 
One of the priority areas for discussion in the North/South Ministerial Council (on the 
island of Ireland) has consistently been that of justice. The Council was established 
under the GFA to develop consultation, cooperation, and action within the island of 
Ireland. Even before this date the House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs 
Committee in their 2009 report on cross–border cooperation between the 
Governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland stated that “In the 
course of our inquiry, we have repeatedly been told… that relations between [the UK 
and ROI] are closer than has ever been the case and that cooperative arrangements 
 
11 For example, in 1975 Northern Ireland produced the slimmest remain majority (52% compared with 
England, Wales and Scotland at, respectively, 69%, 65% and 59%) but the second largest remain 
majority in 2016 (56%, with Scotland voting 59% to remain), See V.  Bognador, Beyond Brexit: 
Towards a British Constitution (I B Taurus, London 2019)  
12 Richard Martin, ‘Ethno-National Narratives of Human Rights: The Northern Ireland Policing Board’ 
(2020) 83(1) Modern Law Review 91 
13 R. Weitzer, Policing Under Fire: Ethnic Conflict and Police–Community Relations in Northern 
Ireland (New York, NY: State University of New York, 1995); G. Ellison and J. Smyth, The Crowned 
Harp: Policing Northern Ireland (London: Pluto Press, 2000). 
14 See, for example: J. O’Brien, Discrimination in Northern Ireland, 1920-1939: Myth or Reality?  
(Cambridge Scholars Publishing: Newcastle upon Tyne  2010) pg. 9-18 and P. Buckland ‘A Protestant 
Parliament and a Protestant State: Regional Government and Religious Discrimination in Northern 
Ireland, 1921-39’ in A.C., Duke and C.A Tamse (eds) Britain and The Netherlands: Volume VII 
Church and State Since the Reformation Papers Delivered to the Seventh Anglo-Dutch Historical 
Conference   (Springer, Dordrecht 1981) pg. 231-242.   
have never run more smoothly.”15 Giving evidence to the committee Lord Carlisle, the 
then UK Government’s independent assessor of terrorism legislation, stated, 
“cooperation is extensive, everyday, operational and essential”.16  The committee 
concluded that devolution of criminal justice and policing matters to Northern Ireland 
would not diminish the need for cooperation between London and Dublin and both 
sides of the border needed to continue to work together towards an even greater level 
of cooperation. 
  
 
The introduction of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) as a third pillar of the EU’s 
architecture in 1992 marked a step change in the level of co-operation between 
Member States in this area. The Treaty of Lisbon finally moved judicial co-operation 
in criminal matters and police cooperation into the JHA pillar and integrated this into 
the EU acquis subject to supervision by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). The European Union recognised the United Kingdom as the relevant Member 
State and there was little formal recognition of devolved nations. However, devolution 
played a limited but important role in criminal justice co-operation with the EU. For 
example, Council Decision 2008/852/JHA established a network of contact points 
within Member States who are responsible for preventing and fighting corruption, and 
who, through cooperation, also act at the EU level. The UK was the only Member State 
to have five representatives in recognition of the fact that policy is this area was 
devolved.17   Every country in the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) system has a 
SIRENE (Supplementary Information Request at the National Entry) Bureau. For the 
UK this is the National Crime Agency (NCA). They act as the legal gateway between 
authorities requesting an arrest and those carrying out an arrest.  However, the Crown 
Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) in Scotland and the Crown Solicitors 
Office (for Northern Ireland), also issue EAWs on behalf of UK police forces when a 
subject is in another Member State. They also represent other Member States’ 
prosecution authorities in seeking extradition from the UK if the wanted person is in 
their jurisdiction. Different courts in each devolved nation also hear EAW appeals.18    
The National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) has its own Criminal Records Office 
(ACRO) which processes requests for information via the European Criminal Records 
Information System (ECRIS) in England and Wales but Police Scotland and the Police 
Service of Northern Ireland process their own requests.   
 
 
Cooperation between the UK and Ireland in policing and criminal matters has long 
predated membership of the EU and much cooperation between the two countries is 
outside of the EU framework.  Today cross-border cooperation between Ireland and 
the UK is anchored by the Intergovernmental Agreement on Co-operation on Criminal 
Justice Matters (July 2005 and April 2010), which provides a structured framework to 
 
15 Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Cross-border co-operation between the Governments of the 
United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, Session 208-09.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Stephen Tierney, ‘The Repatriation of Competencies After Brexit: Justice and Home Affairs’, Centre 
on Constitutional Change, 05 November 2018 
18 Westminster Magistrates Court (for England and Wales), Edinburgh Sheriff Court (for Scotland) and 
Belfast Magistrates Court (for Northern Ireland). The judge or sheriff decides if extradition should be 
ordered.  Similarly, the responsibility for extradition procedures for category 2 countries falls 
respectively, with the Metropolitan Police Service Extradition Unit in England and Wales, the 
International Cooperation Unit in Scotland, and the judges in the Laganside Court in Northern Ireland. 
enhance and develop more effective North-South cooperation and coordination and 
includes a programme of secondment between the two police forces.19 In 2010 and 
again in 2016 the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and An Garda Síochána 
(ASG) launched a Joint Cross-border Policing Strategy, which aims to disrupt criminal 
activity across the border.20 In addition to these more formal structures, the Joint 
Manual of Guidance aims to support police and prosecution services across both 
jurisdictions dealing with investigations that have a cross border element. In November 
2015, the UK and ROI governments and the Northern Ireland Executive agreed to the 
creation of a Joint Agency Task Force as part of a concerted and enhanced effort to 
tackle organised and cross-jurisdictional crime led by senior officers from the PSNI, 
An Garda Siochána (AGS), the Revenue Commissioners and HM Revenue and 
Customs. However, the absence of an Executive in Northern Ireland between 2017 
and 2020 has meant that the work of the task Force has been less visible that it could 
otherwise have been. Every year the PSNI and AGS hold a Cross Border Conference 
on Organised Crime aimed at enhancing cooperation.21  
 
 
Part 2 – risks for the Irish border 
 
 
Despite the close working relationship between the PSNI and AGS Brexit presents a 
risk of increased criminality between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland at a 
time when loss of EU police and judicial co-operation mechanisms could negatively 
impact operational effectiveness. Transnational crime by its nature crosses border and 
any changes to a border can impact the volume or the manner in which criminal gangs 
exploit the border. The extent to which these risks are realised depends on several 
factors. Foremost is what the relationship between the EU and the UK looks like after 
the transition period ends.  The more tangible the border and the greater the regulatory 
divergence between the two states the greater the impact will be on crime. Confusion 
and unfamiliarity at the border could create an incentive to increase illegal operations 
but equally a robustly monitored border will deter offending.22 The greater the loss of 
EU cooperation mechanisms the harder it will be to deal with transnational crime. 
There are three distinct ways in which changes brought about by Brexit could lead to 
increased levels of criminality across the Island of Ireland. Firstly, this could manifest 
itself in the form of immigration crime. Secondly there could be an increase in 
smuggling of commodities. Thirdly terrorist violence could see a resurgence in the 
wake of any intensification of inter-communal tensions. Risks of increased criminal 
activity could be further compounded by a belief that loss of the European Arrest 
Warrant (EAW) and other EU criminal justice cooperation mechanisms decreases the 
risk of detection and/or arrest and that the border could be used to avoid/delay 
prosecution.  The PSNI have highlighted that ‘until Organised Crime Groups have time 
 
19 See <http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/Criminal_justice_co-operation> accessed 03 November 
2020 
20 Available at <https://www.justice-ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/justice/cross-border-
policing-strategy-2016.pdf> accessed 03 November 2020 
21 Written answer from Minister for Justice and Equality, 03 October 2019 available at 
<https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2019-10-03/19/> accessed 03 November 2020 
22 Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Cross-border co-operation on policing, security and criminal 
justice after Brexit, oral evidence, Wednesday 04 November 2020 available at 
<https://parliamentlive.tv/event/index/c565f81a-0af5-4c25-9093-f82a34e79c28> accessed 04 
November 2020 
to assess the vulnerabilities and opportunities EU Exit and the Protocol n 
Ireland/Northern Ireland present, it is unclear what criminal opportunity it presents.’ It 
is therefore important that these risks are constantly assessed in the coming years. 
 
 
Immigration crime 
 
 
The UK and Ireland have never participated in Schengen and both have always 
maintained separate immigration policies in relation to non-EU citizens. Prior to Brexit 
free movement of people meant that the UK and Ireland had the same approach to 
the circa 445 million EU citizens. In the event of a no deal the UK plans to make it 
harder for serious criminals to enter the UK by introducing a tougher UK criminality 
threshold.23 A  new European Temporary Leave to Remain Scheme for EEA citizens 
and their families will be brought in,24 a new immigration system will apply to people 
arriving in the UK from 01 January 2021 and EU citizens wishing to work in the UK will 
need a visa.25 At the same time the UK Government has promised that ‘there will be 
no routine immigration controls on journeys within the Common Travel Area, and none 
on the land border between Northern Ireland and Ireland’.26 Historically there has 
always been a significant degree of practical cooperation and policy coordination in 
immigration control between the UK and Ireland as a risk of exploitation of the CTA 
has always been present. However future divergence of immigration rules between 
the UK and the EU means there will be an increase in those who are able to enter 
Ireland without any form of visa who are not permitted to enter the UK.  There will need 
to be an increase of cooperation and resourcing to reflect this. There is already some 
capacity to deal with immigration crime and human trafficking as is demonstrated by 
Operation Gull. This longstanding operation aims to prevent the movement of 
undocumented migrants crossing the Irish land border and the sea border with Britain 
by conducting periodic document checks at Northern Ireland’s air and seaports. This 
had less impact than originally anticipated because of a failure to recognise and 
effectively prevent racial profiling risks.27 The use of racial profiling was heavily 
criticized by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and O’Hagan has called 
for a human rights centred approach to border controls post Brexit.28 Whilst there has 
always been the possibility that those entering Ireland legally were not legally allowed 
to enter the UK the numbers will increase after the transition period. As an example, 
as of 01 January 2021 the UK government is proposing that EU citizens who have 
served more than a year in jail will face an automatic ban from entering the UK. We 
 
23 Oliver Wright, ‘Britain will bar EU citizens who have served a year in jail, says Priti Patel’, The 
Telegraph, 22 October 2020 
24 See details of announcement at <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-announces-
immigration-plans-for-no-deal-brexit> accessed 03 November 2020 
25See details of announcement at <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/employing-eu-citizens-in-the-uk  
26 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/visiting-the-uk-after-brexit> accessed 03 November 2020   
27 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, Submission to the Committee for the Elimination of all 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, January 2011 available at <https://www.nihrc.org/documents/advice-
to-government/2011/submission-on-international-convention-elimination-racial-discrimination-
february-2011.pdf> accessed 03 November 2020  
28 Fidelma O’Hagan, ‘Brexit and Immigration Control in Northern Ireland’, BrexitLawNI available at 
<https://brexitlawni.org/blog/brexit-immigration-control-northern-
ireland/#:~:text=The%20use%20of%20racial%20profiling%20has%20been%20criticised,human%20ri
ghts%20groups%20for%20its%20lack%20of%20transparency> accessed 03 November 2020 
need to have a better understanding of the impact of such a policy and how it will be 
enforced, particularly across the Irish border. 
 
Whilst sea ports across the south of England are still the most common entry point, in 
the last few years there has already been an increase in the use of Northern Ireland 
via the Republic as an entry route to the rest of the UK.29 Northern Ireland has a well-
documented problem with organized crime and these gangs are well placed to exploit 
perceived weaknesses in immigration control.30 A close working relationship between 
border control agencies in both countries is needed to minimise the risk of undetected 
arrival in Ireland which would then facilitate entry to the UK through the border. Arrival 
in Ireland makes it very easy to move to the UK through the Common Travel Area,31 
and it is therefore vital that there is investment in collaborative border procedures and 
efficient data sharing. Currently much of this cooperation is underpinned by EU 
instruments, particularly Prüm and the PNR Directive. Although Ireland has not 
implemented SIS II, it plans to do so imminently, and the PSNI regularly use it at 
borders and are concerned about its loss. Current data exchange does not all fall 
within EU mechanisms. It was noted in evidence to the British-Irish Parliamentary 
Assembly in 2016 that the British and Irish border agencies had plans to enhance 
biometric collection for example.32  In December 2011 the UK and Irish governments 
signed a non-binding joint statement on cooperation measures to secure the external 
Common Travel Area and a Memorandum of Understanding on visa data exchange.33 
Information exchange is vital. The benefit of high-quality exchange of information can 
be seen from a pilot exchange to check data provided in 1,700 Irish visa applications 
lodged in Nigeria against UK immigration records. This identified over 200 persons 
applying to come to Ireland who had adverse UK immigration history.34 Cooperation 
in this area of information exchange has been superseded by EU mechanisms such 
as Prüm and is now overseen, from a data protection perspective, by the Law 
Enforcement Directive. If the UK leaves the EU without a agreement and without an 
adequacy decision this not only means that access to EU data would be denied from 
1 January 2021, but even the bilateral exchange of data between the UK and Ireland 
could be put into jeopardy in the medium term. This is discussed in greater detail 
below. 
 
 
29 McGuinness, Gower and Wilkins, supra n(8) at page 8: “According to a BBC report of July 2015, in 
2014/15 468 irregular migrants were intercepted at ports in Northern Ireland trying to reach other 
parts of the UK, compared to 274 in 2012/13. The Home Office attributed the rise to increases in 
migration movement patterns and increased enforcement activity” 
30 John Jupp and Matthew Garrod, ‘Legacies of the Troubles: The Links between Organised Crime 
and terrorism in Northern Ireland’ (2019) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, published online 04 Nov 
2019 
31 Immigration Act 1971, section 1(3) - people seeking entry to the UK from the Republic of Ireland are 
not subject to immigration control. Paragraph 15 of the Immigration Rules and section 9 of the 1971 
Act contain further provisions related to the CTA. However, there are some exceptions, as specified in 
the Immigration (Control of Entry through Republic of Ireland) Order 1972 (as amended). 
32 British-Irish Parliamentary Assembly, Committee B (European Affairs), Report on Visas, 5 July 2016 
33 See 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/9
9045/21197-mea-sec-trav.pdf> accessed 03 November 2020 
34 Department of Justice and Equality, Ireland, Press Release 20 December 2011 available at 
<http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Pages/IRELAND-
UK%20ACCORD%20TO%20FURTHER%20SECURE%20THE%20COMMON%20TRAVEL%20ARE
A > accessed 03 November 2020 
Whilst there has been no current suggestion that the PSNI will be involved in 
immigration checks at the border there has been recent legislation which paves the 
way for this. The Counter Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 “ensures that the 
police and security services have the powers they need… to keep the public safe’35 
and provides a new power to stop, question, search and detain an individual at a port 
or border area to determine whether they are, or have been, involved in hostile state 
activity without the need for reasonable suspicion.36 The border area is defined as one 
mile from the Irish border or the first place at which a train travelling from the Republic 
of Ireland stops.37 There is also a separate power to question a person in the Northern 
Ireland border area in order to establish whether the person is in that area for the 
purpose of entering or leaving Northern Ireland.38 Whilst these powers are limited to 
counter terrorism cases Walker has stated that “the new powers have the potential to 
cause friction with Border communities”.39 the PSNI have repeatedly stressed that it is 
essential for the maintenance of peace in Northern Ireland that they can remain a 
policing service and they are not seen as a border security service.40 
 
 
Smuggling of commodities 
 
 
Historically between the 1920s and 1960s smuggling across the border to avoid paying 
duty on everyday goods was widespread. More recently this has remained a feature 
of the border notwithstanding the customs union as there remained differing tax 
regimes in relation to fuel, cigarettes, and alcohol.  Elaborate fuel laundering 
operations which are estimated to have cost the tax-payer £40 million in 2017 alone 
are an example of this sort of activity.41 Northern Ireland has seen a rise in organised 
crime in recent years which has been linked to ‘paramilitary diversification’.42 Such 
organisations are well placed to take advantage of different excise duties, VAT 
regimes and other differences in regulation or standards after 1 January 2021.   How 
to manage the movement of goods between Great Britain and Northern Ireland after 
Brexit whilst maintaining an open border between Ireland and Northern Ireland has 
been a continual thorn in the side of both the UK and the EU. The history of violence 
 
35 Rt Hon Ben Wallace MP, Minister of State for Security and Economic Crime see Home Office, 
Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 Overarching Fact Sheet available at 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/9
12084/2019-02-12_Overarching_Fact_Sheet_RA.pdf> accessed 03 November 2020 
36 Counter Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, section 22 and schedule 3, paragraph 1(1) 
37 Counter Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, schedule 3, paragraph 64(6) 
38 Counter Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, schedule 3, paragraph 2. It is essentially a pre-
cursor power to enable an examining officer to determine whether the conditions in schedule 3, 
paragraph 1 are met. 
39 Clive Walker, written evidence submitted to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Cross-border 
co-operation on policing, security and criminal justice after Brexit, published 21 October 2020 
40 Julian O’Neill, ‘Brexit: PSNI ‘won’t police customs checkpoints’, says chief constable’, BBC News 03 
October 2019 
41 Written evidence from Alex Wood, Minister of the Environment to the Northern Ireland Affairs 
Committee, 14 November 2011 available at 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmniaf/writev/fuel/m12.htm> accessed 03 
November 2020  
42 John Jupp and Matthew Garrod, ‘Legacies of the Troubles: The Links between Organized Crime 
and Terrorism in Northern Ireland’ (2019) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, published online 04 
November 2019 
in Northern Ireland, means that the form of policing and other controls on the border 
between Ireland and Northern Ireland remains deeply sensitive. The Good Friday 
(Belfast) Agreement 1998 and the fragile peace that followed have been made 
possible, in part, because of the removal of visible signs of the border. 
 
The Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol in the UK EU Withdrawal Agreement43 gives 
Northern Ireland a unique status: both within the UK internal market and customs 
territory, and de facto in the EU’s single market for goods and subject to the Union 
Customs Code (UCC).44 This is designed so that goods circulating in Northern Ireland 
can cross the border in Ireland (i.e. into the EU’s single market) without checks. One 
benefit of this is that there would be  no significant changes to the UK/EU customs 
frontier and this should mean the incentive to smuggle goods would not radically 
expand beyond the pre-existing incentive of avoiding VAT and excise duty. However, 
the Protocol effectively creates a customs and regulatory border down the Irish Sea 
and Hayward has highlighted that the degree to which this will cause an incentive for 
smuggling between the Great Britain and Northern Ireland depends, at the time of 
writing,45 on a number of presently unanswered questions.46  Firstly, whether there is 
a UK-EU free trade agreement (FTA). Such an agreement would minimise incentives 
for smuggling across the Irish Sea because there will be no scope to exploit tariff 
differentials. If there is no FTA, then there will be increased incentives for smuggling 
across the Irish Sea from GB in order to access the EU single market and thus avoid 
paying tariffs levied on legitimate GB to EU trade. This risk will be greatest for those 
goods which could face the highest EU tariffs. In such a no deal scenario, there will 
also be increased risk of smuggling of goods into GB from the Republic of Ireland in 
order to avoid tariffs on imports to the UK (GB) coming from the EU. This could come 
directly from Ireland (e.g. Dublin-Holyhead) or via Northern Ireland. The degree of risk 
depends on how the movement in goods from NI to GB is managed, and on how goods 
qualify as ‘Northern Irish’ for unfettered access. This is still to be determined. However, 
the risk of smuggling across the Irish Sea is lower than that of smuggling across the 
Irish border given the added logistical difficulties and the costs of movement across a 
sea border impacts the profitability of such smuggling. It is also simpler to effectively 
manage and control entry and exit of goods from specified air and seaports rather than 
across a 500km land border of some 280 crossings.47   
 
Secondly, the risk of smuggling depends on the degree to which the UK diverges from 
EU standards. Under a strict conformity with the protocol Northern Ireland would 
continue to follow EU rules when it comes to the production of goods and state aids. 
 
43 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the 
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44 Available at <https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/union-customs-code/ucc-
introduction_en#:~:text=The%20Union%20Customs%20Code%20%28UCC%29%20%E2%80%93%
20Introduction.%20The,adapted%20to%20modern%20trade%20models%20and%20communication
%20tools> accessed 03 November 2020  
45 As of 03 November 2020 
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<https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/10/19/how-does-the-uk-internal-market-bill-relate-to-northern-
ireland/> accessed 03 November 2020 
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Cross-Border co-operation on policing, security and criminal justice after Brexit inquiry, published 07 
October 2020 available at < https://committees.parliament.uk/work/534/crossborder-cooperation-on-
policing-security-and-criminal-justice-after-brexit/publications/> accessed 03 November 2020 
Goods would not be allowed into Northern Ireland unless they met those standards. If 
the UK remains largely aligned in practice to EU standards, then the need for controls 
will be minimal. The UK Internal Market Bill48 means that if one part of Great Britain 
decides to lower standards, then those goods will not be confined to that part of Great 
Britain but can circulate freely across it. A ‘race to the bottom’ would mean that there 
will be a need for tighter controls on goods entering NI from GB.49 Foods produced to 
lower standards are cheaper to produce and the incentives to smuggle such goods 
into Northern Ireland, and in some cases for onward transmission into Ireland, would 
be greatest where the price differential is significant. 
 
Thirdly, the risk of smuggling across the Irish Sea is not just about GB or EU goods 
but those from the Rest of the World (ROW). Differentials between the UK Global Tariff 
and EU Common External Tariff could affect the attractiveness of smuggling across  
thousands of product lines. Where the differences are greatest (e.g. in processed 
agricultural produce), then the incentive for the ROW imports into GB and then into 
the EU via NI will be the highest. It is for this reason that the EU Commission proposed 
that tariff differentials form the basis for the definition of goods as being “at risk” of 
being smuggled into NI from GB (and would thus be subject to tariff payment in 
advance).  This issue will remain live as the UK secures new FTAs around the world.  
 
On 1 January 2021 the basis on which Northern Ireland trades with other parts of the 
United Kingdom is expected to change overnight and a range of new legal 
arrangements and systems should come in to place. Predicated even on full 
implementation of the protocol the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee concluded ‘the 
Protocol will undoubtedly create new opportunities for smuggling and fraud.’50 
Organised criminal gangs already operate in Northern Ireland and ‘such criminals will 
undoubtedly attempt to exploit the new situation created by the Protocol and will seek 
to profit illegally from the new trading arrangements in Northern Ireland.’51 Following 
the introduction of the UK Internal Market Bill [and the much greater prospect of a no 
deal outcome for the 2020 negotiations] the opportunities created for criminals as a 
result of Brexit anticipated by the Northern Ireland Select Committee in July 2020 may 
be substantially greater. While it is impossible at the time of writing to offer a clear 
assessment of the potential range and impact of smuggling that will emerge at the end 
of the transition period, it is clear that it will contribute to significantly higher threats 
that will require increased criminal justice cooperation within the CTA and concomitant 
increases in resources.52 
 
The Institute for Government believes that the UK authorities will not be ready to 
implement the Protocol effectively from 1 January 2021 stating that “at its most severe, 
non-compliance with the protocol may generate the need for the Irish government to 
impose checks elsewhere on the island of Ireland, potentially creating political and 
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security risks in Northern Ireland.”53  The introduction of a new customs arrangements 
is an opportunity for new kinds of fraud and this will need to be monitored closely 
moving forward. The EU will be keen to assess the scale and immediacy of the 
subsequent risk for smuggling/criminality exploiting a poorly enforced sea border. 
Such risks are enhanced in a no deal scenario. A key element to ensuring effective 
enforcement of the new arrangements will be close cooperation between police and 
border authorities in the UK and Ireland.54 The new arrangements, particularly in a no 
deal scenario, will require a greater level of cooperation at a time when operational 
effectiveness is undermined through loss of key data sharing mechanisms.  
 
 
 
 
Resurgence of domestic terrorism 
 
 
The Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement 1998 was supposed to take ‘the border out of 
Irish politics’.55 Gormley-Heenan and Aughey argue that Brexit was presented in 
Northern Ireland along nationalist and unionist lines which served to confirm old 
divisions.56 Brexit means that the border of the European Union now runs though the 
island of Ireland and that not only has implications for the free movement of people 
and goods as discussed above but also it is ‘freighted with meanings of identity’57 This 
inevitably has implications for political stability in Northern Ireland. Hayward and 
Murphy have highlighted that the 1998 Agreement ‘redefined relations across these 
islands in a way that has defused the border as a cause for political conflict and 
violence’58. Central to the 1998 Agreement was the context provided by the UK and 
Ireland’s membership of the European Union which enabled cooperation to be 
normalized and depoliticized. This can be seen in the agreement itself which stated 
that both countries were committed to the agreement as ‘friendly neighbours and as 
partners in the European Union’.59 Hayward and Murphy also highlighted that: 
 
The impact of Brexit is such that two states will now diverge, leaving Northern Ireland in the 
awkward place between. After Brexit, without a careful arrangement for managing UK/EU (and 
British–Irish) relations, divergence will happen in law, trade, security, values, the fundamental 
rights of citizens, and politics—all such areas reach to the very core of the Good Friday 
Agreement and put it at risk of deep fissures.60 
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Bognador has noted how Brexit imposes serious strains on the GFA. With Unionist 
politicians regarding any special status for Northern Ireland in the Brexit readjustment 
process as weakening ties to the rest of the UK. While Nationalist leaders - having 
seen Unionist support for Brexit as a unilateral repudiation of the compromises that 
the GFA entailed - advocated such special arrangements, whether the whole island of 
Ireland EU membership pledge or going further than the customs and regulatory 
arrangements envisaged in the Withdrawal Agreement.61   
 
The extent to which Brexit creates a risk of a  resurgence in domestic terrorism in the 
coming years is unclear but academics  have argued that Brexit places peace at risk.62 
Since the cease fire and agreement there has still been residual terrorist activity which 
increased in the run-up to the Scottish referendum.  The sensitivity of the border comes 
in to play when we look at how to mitigate the risks of illegal migration and smuggling 
of commodities discussed above. Research suggests that any physical manifestation 
of a border would be a prime target particularly for the Republican movement: 
 
It is eminently possible that post-Provisional IRA elements could mobilise a more determined 
and effective effort were robust popular support – which did not exist before 1969 – to emerge 
on the basis of the tangible costs of Brexit, pecuniary and otherwise, to the nationalist 
community and cause.63  
 
 
Dissident Republican terrorists have in the past used the land border to frustrate 
counter-terrorism operations, while they and other organised crime gangs breached 
bail and crossed the land border to avoid prosecution. A 2017 study highlighted that 
42% of respondents were concerned about Brexit resulting in a return to the conflict.64 
Almost half of respondents were not willing to accept any ‘technological; means of 
border control.65  Just as the process of European integration was one of the catalysts 
for the depoliticization of Irish/Northern Irish cross-border cooperation the UK’s 
departure from the EU removes this context and reintroduces a political dimension to 
co-operation. The UK must resist a knee-jerk reaction to crime threats at the border 
which will undermine the fragile peace agreement. The current domestic terrorist 
threat level in Northern Ireland is already graded as ‘severe’ by MI5. In recent months 
Operation Arbacia demonstrated that the terrorism threat in Northern Ireland is very 
real.66 
 
 
Part 3 – loss of EU cooperation measures 
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Despite the positive number of bi-lateral police cooperation arrangements between the 
AGS and PSNI outlined in Part 1, EU processes and institutions still facilitate much of 
the cooperation between the PSNI and the AGS. Both forces have made clear that 
such arrangements enable them to provide a quicker, more efficient and dynamic 
response to crime and criminality and allow significant coordinated operations 
particularly against organised criminal gangs.67 The ability to accurately and quickly 
access up-to-date information and criminal intelligence has been the hallmark of EU 
police and criminal justice measures since the Hague Programme68 which introduced 
the concept of availability as the guiding concept for law enforcement information 
exchange.69 The expansion of the EU, including the introduction of the Schengen 
borderless area and the well-established principle of free movement of persons has 
continually strengthened the need for criminal justice cooperation and the sharing of 
personal data between Member States.70  The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 
2009 fundamentally transformed the EU’s power to adopt police and criminal justice 
measures. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon the United Kingdom has 
benefited from a bespoke arrangement which allowed it to use a ‘wait and see’ strategy 
which permitted for opt in on a case by case basis after adoption based on the final 
text. This exceptional status for the UK (and Ireland) can be argued to have led to 
“risks of deep imbalances for the European criminal justice area.”71 The potential loss 
of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) and information databases are frequently cited 
as being of most concern to law enforcement.72 The loss of the EAW is discussed by 
Arnell and Davies elsewhere in this special issue and therefore this article focuses on 
the loss of data-sharing tools. The most important databases for UK law enforcement 
are: the exchange of biometric data under the Prüm Instruments (Prüm); the exchange 
of criminal records information via the European Criminal Records Information System 
(ECRIS); the exchange of intelligence data under the Second Generation Schengen 
Information System (SIS II) the Swedish Initiative and Naples II. Each of these 
databases serves a different purpose and therefore has a different legal basis. Whilst 
this has in the past been only of technical interest it comes to the fore in negotiating 
the UK’s post Brexit relationship with the EU. The purpose of each database and the 
barriers to post Brexit access will be briefly explored.  Briefly discussed will also be 
other EU tools of importance to prosecutors and Customs and Exercise. 
 
 
 Exchange of biometric data under Prüm Instruments 
 
The Prüm Decisions are EU Council Decisions73 that provide a mechanism for 
exchanging DNA, fingerprint and vehicle registration data between Member States for 
the prevention and investigation of cross-border crime and terrorism. Prüm provides 
for the exchange of DNA profiles in just 15 minutes, fingerprints within 24 hours and 
vehicle registration data in as little as 10 seconds. The speed of the response times 
and the automated nature of Prüm ensure its usefulness as an operational tool.  The 
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UK government initially opted out of Prüm but voted to re-join in 2015.74 The Prüm 
database is decentralised and operates on a hit/no hit basis. If a match is found full 
access to the profile has to then be requested as the initial automated search excludes 
any personal information.  Mutual legal assistance channels can then be used to follow 
up on the hit to obtain personal or other information associated with the DNA profile 
or fingerprint.  
 
The Prüm regime offers a number of safeguards to ensure adequate protection of 
individual rights related to the cross-border exchange of personal data.  In addition to 
stipulating that automated searches may only be undertaken in individual crimes each 
Member State identifies the data that is accessible to other Member States and 
determines the conditions for automated searching.75   Member States will never 
obtain personal data about the DNA profile or fingerprints if there is not a match for a 
submitted profile. The UK has one of the most robust regimes for the disclosing of 
information via Prüm providing that that only DNA crime scene profiles with more than 
eight loci will be shared with other Member States via Prüm as a method of ensuring 
the number of false hits is kept to a minimum. 76 Personal data relating to a profile will 
only be shared if 10 or more loci are matched reducing the likelihood of a false match 
event further. Finally the UK only allows Member States to search the profiles or 
fingerprints of those who have been convicted in the UK and information relating to 
those under 18 will only be shared if a formal Letter of Request via mutual legal 
assistance channels is used.  The safeguards which are already embedded in the 
Prüm decisions, the additional safeguards introduced by the UK and the fact that it is 
already operational has always eased the way for the UK to continue to have access 
to Prüm after Brexit. Importantly Prüm is not technically part of the Schengen acquis 
and therefore non-Schengen participation should not be a bar to access. The draft text 
of the Agreement on the New Partnership with the United Kingdom published by the 
EU on 18 March 2020 offers access to Prüm.77 
 
 
Exchange of criminal records information via the European 
Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) 
 
 
The European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) provides a 
decentralised system for the exchange of information on criminal convictions between 
Member States. Through ECRIS Member States are able to request criminal 
conviction information from the Member State which is the country of origin of an 
individual. Member States convicting a foreign national who is a citizen of another 
Member State are obliged to inform the country of origin about the conviction so that 
the country of origin may store that information. The UK is the fourth largest user of 
ECRIS and access to this database has been cited as a particular priority for the UK.78  
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The UK also opted in to a draft proposal in 2016 which aims to expand ECRIS to 
include third country nationals.79 Losing access to ECRIS could lengthen response 
times for requests of a foreign national’s criminal record back to an average of 66 days 
rather than the 10 days provided for under ECRIS. As with SIS II there is no precedent 
for a non-EU country accessing ECRIS (not event non-EU Schengen countries do).  
The proposed EU treaty does not offer access to ECRIS but does offer some 
improvements to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
1959. The treaty proposes communication of criminal record information on each 
other’s nationals once a month rather than once a year and provides for electronic 
exchange, although the technical details of this are not yet published. If a deal is 
arranged which ensures enhancement of the 1959 Convention this could be broadly 
comparable to the Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA particularly if the EU 
would agree to the UK using the current technical platform. This would mean that whilst 
the underpinning legislation would alter the means by which criminal records are 
exchanged would not. The extent to which the UK would have access to a comparable 
system to ECRIS in the event of a deal being made on security remains to be seen. 
 
 
Exchange of intelligence data under the Second Generation Schengen 
Information System (SIS II) 
 
The Second Generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) “is a highly efficient 
large-scale information system that supports external border control and law 
enforcement cooperation in the Schengen States”80. SIS II operates a series of “real 
time” alerts which can be accessed by law enforcement agencies and border control 
officials. Under SIS II border officials can enter and consult alerts in respect of persons 
whose entry or stay in the Schengen Area has been refused.81 As the UK is not 
currently part of the Schengen Area it does not have access to this aspect of SIS II.  
Another aspect of SIS II relates to law enforcement cooperation in which competent 
authorities are able to create and consult alerts relating to missing persons and 
persons or objects related to criminal offences.82 This may, for example, relate to 
persons who are subject to a European Arrest Warrant. The UK currently has access 
to this aspect of SIS II along with the ability of vehicle registration services to access 
alerts on vehicles, registration certificates and number plates.83 It has taken the UK 
several years to connect to SIS and the database only went live in 2017 at a cost of 
£39 million. The UK government is understandably keen to continue to have access 
observing that ‘from April 2015 to April 2016, over 6,400 foreign alerts received hits in 
the UK, allowing UK enforcement agencies to take appropriate action, whilst over 
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6,600 UK-issued alerts received hits across Europe.’84 Access to SIS provides officers 
on the street with the ability to check alerts in real time. 
 
Currently 30 countries operate the SIS II system including four ‘Schengen Associated 
Countries’.85 Alerts on SIS II are stored in a central database and are immediately 
accessible to around two million end-users. The current rules provide that data 
processed in SIS II (which include biometric information) “shall not be transferred or 
made available to third countries”. Changes proposed by the European Commission 
(expected to take effect after 2021) would go further, extending the prohibition to any 
“related supplementary information” provided by a Member State in connection with a 
SIS alert86.  There is no legal basis in the EU treaties for a non-EU, non-Schengen 
country to participate in SIS II. Third party countries can only obtain SIS information 
by asking Europol to run a search for them. In 2010 the UK requested to join the Visa 
Information System87 for law enforcement purposes but was denied. Although non-
EU, Schengen countries like Iceland, Norway and Switzerland have access they must 
pay into the EU budget and have to accept the supremacy of the CJEU in relation to 
disputes and have incorporated the relevant parts of the Schengen acquis into their 
domestic law. They must also apply EU data protection standards.  The EU has 
repeatedly stated that access to SIS II can not be granted even if an overarching deal 
on security cooperation could be made.88 However the EU treaty does provide of 
‘cooperation on operational information. This is discussed in further detail below but 
would be the only replacement for the capabilities currently provided for by SIS II. This 
means that information is provided in response to a request rather than through real 
time access to the database. There will therefore not be a replacement which mirrors 
the capabilities of SIS II. This would also apply to The Secure Information Exchange 
Network Application (SIENA) via Europol. The EU draft treaty provides ongoing 
cooperation with Europol via liaison officers but there are limitations on the exchange 
of personal and non-personal data which would not provide direct access to SIENA. 
 
 
The Swedish Initiative 
 
 
The Swedish Initiative provides a common legal framework for the effective and 
expeditious exchange of existing information and criminal intelligence between EU 
Member States law enforcement authorities.89 It is also regulates the conditions for 
exchanging information and intelligence among EU Member States, including time 
limits and justifications for refusing to share data. Member States must ensure that 
conditions for obtaining information are not stricter than those provided for at national 
level. The proposed EU Treaty includes provisions for the sharing of operational 
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information to law enforcement authorities. However, it states that no data processed 
in databases established on the basis of Union law shall be provided to the United 
Kingdom in response to a request. The EU proposals mirror the Swedish Initiative in 
that States must ensure the conditions for accessing information and intelligence are 
not stricter than those applicable at domestic level. States should respond to a request 
within eight hours to urgent requests. Spontaneous exchanges of information are also 
provided for.90  
 
 
Naples II 
 
 
The Naples II Convention is designed for mutual assistance and cooperation between 
customs administrations and other law enforcement agencies responsible for 
enforcing the law in relation to customs infringements.91 Mutual assistance between 
customs authorities is given following a request for information, surveillance, enquiries 
or notification; or spontaneously, without prior request, including covert surveillance 
and spontaneous provision of information. Customs administrations must provide 
each other with the necessary staff and organisational support when cooperating on 
cross-border issues such as hot pursuit, cross-border surveillance, covert 
investigations; joint special investigation teams; and controlled deliveries. Article 40 
Schengen Convention provides for police authorities and customs authorities to 
continue surveillance across the border of another State subject to conditions. The UK 
hopes to agree an International Customs Co-operation and Mutual Administrative 
Assistance Agreement with the EU.92 In the event of a no deal bilateral agreements 
would be the only way forward.93 
 
 
Data adequacy 
 
 
Exchange of data with a “third country” (any non-EU or EEA Member State) is subject 
to a guarantee that the personal data will receive an “adequate” level of protection.  
The Data Protection Act 2018 aims to ensure UK compliance with the GDPR, the Law 
Enforcement Directive, and the Council of Europe’s Convention No. 108.94 However, 
since the Act does not reproduce verbatim the said instruments, and was intended to 
be read alongside the GDPR, whilst compliance is likely, it is not guaranteed. A bigger 
threat remains how the UK will ensure future compliance with evolving EU data 
protection standards post Brexit. This question is not only crucial to the obtaining of 
an agreement with the EU but is also necessary for bilateral cooperation with any 
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Member State. The EU draft text requires a data adequacy decision as a precondition 
for cooperation. This is a unilateral assessment by the Commission that the UK’s data 
protection regime is ‘essentially the same’ as EU data protection laws. It is noteworthy 
that adequacy decisions adopted under the Data Protection Directive and the GDPR 
do not cover data exchanges in the law enforcement sector. Therefore, an ad-hoc 
adequacy decision under the Law Enforcement Directive will also be necessary.  As 
the UK is starting from a point of unprecedented alignment with EU data protection 
rules this has not been anticipated as a problem. However, the UK draft text seeks to 
agree bespoke data protection provisions with the EU which would mean cooperation 
would not depend on data adequacy. This is because the UK wants to be free to 
explore its own data protection policy after Brexit rather than remaining tied to EU data 
protection policy. Whether the UK is willing to compromise on this position has yet to 
be seen. 
 
 
The European court has been active in recent years in the field of data protection. In 
the case of Schrems95 the court made it clear that adequacy decisions do not 
necessarily provide a stable solution by invalidating the European Commission’s 
adequacy decision underlying the EU-US Safe Harbour agreement. In Schrems II96 
the court invalidated the adequacy rating of the US ‘Privacy Shield’, the successor of 
Safe Harbour, on the basis, inter alia, of a lack of necessary limitations and safeguards 
on the power of the authorities in the US. In a recent case brought by Privacy 
International97 challenging the practice of bulk communications data in the UK the 
CJEU ruled that the e-Privacy Directive98 precludes national legislation from ordering 
telecommunication companies to transfer data in a “general and indiscriminate” 
manner to security agencies even for the purposes of national security. These cases 
demonstrate the CJEU’s strong affirmation of data protection and have implications 
going beyond data transfers to the US. It is clear that practices relating to national 
security measures although outside of the competence of the EU fall within the remit 
of the court as they pertain to EU data protection. The Privacy International case 
throws doubt on whether the UK data protection regime would be awarded “adequacy” 
or not. Secondly, even if it is, Schrems II demonstrates that the CJEU is willing to 
robustly assess mechanisms for granting adequacy decisions and has the power to 
strike them down. The Luxembourg court appears to be requiring a standard of 
protection close to that of GDPR and has little interest in third country norms. The UK 
and EU will need to ensure transparency in any data adequacy decision to ensure its 
ongoing stability. If the UK wants to exchange data in the field of police and criminal 
justice, it will have to comply with evolving EU data protection law without any say in 
how that law evolves. Another relevant CJEU case is the decision to strike down a 
bespoke PNR agreement with the US and Canada on the basis that it was 
incompatible with the fundamental rights recognised by the EU. Particularly 
problematic was the retention and possible subsequent transfer of that data to non-
member countries for the purposes of combating terrorism and forms of serious 
transnational crime.  The case demonstrates that it will be easier for the UK to seek 
 
95 Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner. 
96 Case C-311/18, “Schrems II” 
97 Case C-623/17 
98 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning 
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector 
(Directive on privacy and electronic communications) 
an associated status to the existing EU scheme rather than negotiate a bespoke PNR 
agreement and then keep in step legally and technically with the EU and other 
associated state members. The need for inter-governmental machinery for the UK to 
be able to efficiently negotiate and implement changes to keep UK-EU criminal justice 
cooperation measures in step with developments in the AFJS acquis is considered in 
some detail by Wilson in this special issue.99  
 
 
 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and the ECHR 
 
 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms is also now central to EU data 
protection law, with a number of cases rely on Article 8 of the Charter in preference to 
other EU data protection provisions. The UK Government has excluded the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights from ‘EU retained law’ after Brexit.100 Human rights are not only 
essential to data adequacy, but human rights are bundled into criminal justice and 
security cooperation more broadly.101 The EU wants cooperation to be conditional on 
a commitment from the UK to the ECHR and domestic implementation of it. If the UK 
abrogates its effect the agreement would be immediately suspended. It is usual for the 
EU to ask for ECHR compliance in third country agreements, but the UK argues that 
this level of compliance is unprecedented and is an unreasonable constraint on the 
UK’s ability to determine an aspects of its own internal legal order.  The UK proposed 
draft text states that the UK recognises that concerns about the level of protection of 
human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law may be a grounds 
for suspending or terminating cooperation, but makes no direct reference to the ECHR 
or the Human Rights Act 1998. However, the UK has shown recent signs of 
compromise and it is reported in the press that the UK has agreed “not to materially 
alter the spirit” of the Human Rights Act 1998. Offering credible guarantees about 
future human rights compliance is essential for ongoing cooperation on criminal justice 
and security as it is underpinned by the principles of mutual recognition and mutual 
trust. Much of that mutual trust is based on adherence to ECHR standards.  
Fundamental rights are not only at the heart of the EU project but also distilled into the 
internal legal orders of Member States. Heffernan has demonstrated that ‘the ECHR 
is therefore a valuable bridge in shoring up fundamental rights commitments in the 
arrangements that will define the UK’s future relationship with the EU’. 102 However 
compliance with the ECHR is not only a pre-requisite for cooperation with the EU it is 
also likely to prove to be essential for any bilateral cooperation with Member States 
such as Ireland, even when based on Council of Europe conventions.103 
 
 
 
99 TJ Wilson, ‘Prisoner Transfer within the Irish-UK Common Travel Area (CTA) after Brexit: human 
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101 P. Hustinx, M. Kennedy, S. Carrera, V. Mitsilegas, M. Stefan and Fabio Giuffrida, ‘Criminal Justice 
and Police Cooperation between the EU and the UK after Brexit’ (2018) Centre for European Policy 
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102 Liz Heffernan, ‘Irish Criminal Trials and European Legal Culture: A Backdrop to Brexit’ in this issue. 
103 The extent to which EU law sets parameters for member state bi-lateral criminal justice 
cooperation with third states is considered in Wilson (n99) 
Despite the positive number of bi-lateral police cooperation arrangements between the 
AGS and PSNI, data sharing is facilitated by participation in EU criminal justice 
cooperation measures. Between the UK and Ireland a huge amount of data is 
exchanged. This was estimated by network members to be between 60-70K items of 
shared information a year.  Even if the UK and the EU were to reach an agreement 
broadly on the lines currently offered by the UK there would be a loss of SIS II data 
and a decrease in the operational effectiveness of criminal records exchange. A no 
deal scenario would result in the loss of Prüm, PNR and a substitute ECRIS. Such 
losses would be keenly felt. It is not simply a case of reverting to relying on ‘goodwill’ 
between the PSNI and AGS. Data protection has transformed data exchange in recent 
years. Without a data adequacy decision or a clear legal basis, exchange of 
information will not be possible for day to day policing. This is particularly concerning 
for the PSNI and AGS who have to deal with an open land border at a time when there 
is an increased risk of exploitation of that border for criminal gain and the imposition 
of physical barriers will inevitably increase tension and risk further destabilising the 
peace agreement. 
 
 
Part 4 - Possible solutions and models of future cooperation 
 
 
There are three primary possible solutions for the future relationship between the UK 
and the EU. Firstly the EU could conclude an agreement or multiple agreements with 
the UK; secondly the UK could sign a series of bilateral agreements between the UK 
and Member States which are completed with the agreement of the EU; thirdly the UK 
could default to existing Council of Europe mechanisms of cooperation.  The first 
solution is favoured by both the EU and the UK as this would be the most efficient and 
legally sound option which ensures that EU competence in criminal matters is not 
undermined and the UK can cooperate with all partners using the same instrument. 
Both parties have been committed to an agreement but at the time of writing, with only 
weeks to go before the end of transition period, there are still significant barriers to 
overcome. The second option is sub-optimal for the UK because it would be time 
consuming and legally complex to cooperate with Member States on 26 different 
terms. However, functioning cooperation, particularly between the UK and Ireland has 
to be the highest priority. Bilateral agreements could be an intermediary route which 
allow for cooperation to continue with the UK’s most important partners whilst a more 
permanent EU wide solution is found. If none of these measures are put into place 
quickly enough then the UK will, by default, fall back to existing Council of Europe 
mechanisms of cooperation.  
 
 
Bilateral agreements with Ireland 
 
The EU’s competences are divided between areas of exclusive competence, where a 
member State is not permitted to make their own laws concerning that area, and 
shared competence where both the EU and the Member State may make laws. 
However, in areas of shared competence Member States can only exercise their 
competence to the extent that the EU has not exercised or has ceased to exercise its 
own competence.104 However the EU shall also have exclusive competence for the 
conclusion of ‘an international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a 
legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal 
competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their 
scope.’105  Article 4 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU, provides for shared 
competence which includes the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). It is 
argued that the AFSJ parts of the proposed EU treaty fall under Article 3(2) rather than 
Article 4 as the whole treaty is “an international agreement… provided for in a 
legislative act of the Union.”  If this is the case, then Article 4 of the Directive 
Implementing the Withdrawal Agreement comes into effect. Article 4 allows for Ireland 
to seek permission to enter into a bi-lateral agreement "in areas of exclusive 
competence of the Union" if is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
arrangements provided for in the Northern Ireland protocol.106  It may be possible for 
Ireland to obtain permission from the EU to enter into bilateral agreements with the UK 
in the area of police and criminal justice cooperation on the basis that such 
agreement(s) are required to maintain the Common Travel Area.  
 
 
If this permission was denied would the UK and Ireland be free to enter into bilateral 
negotiations in the event of a no deal? AFSJ is an area of shared competence in which 
either the EU or Member States can adopt legal acts. Where the EU has exercised its 
shared competence, Member States are not free to exercise their competence, but 
may do so again once the EU ceases to exercise the competence. This would happen 
if the EU repealed a legislative act without replacing it.107 However even if negotiations 
were to fail many aspects of criminal justice cooperation remain an area of 
competence of the EU. An example of this can be seen in the decision of the 
Commission to launch infringement proceedings in October 2019 against Austria, 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania for signing an agreement with 5 Western Balkan 
countries on the automated exchange of DNA data, dactyloscopy data and vehicle 
registration in 2018. The Commission considers the agreement is in breach of EU 
exclusive competence in the area as it is covered by the Prüm Council Decisions.108 
However, in extradition it is clear that states are free to enter into bilateral agreements 
with third parties.109 The difference between an extradition agreement and an 
agreement to exchange DNA appears to be that the latter may involve access to EU 
databases. This places limits on the types of bilateral agreements that the UK can 
form with Member States. As the case has not progressed past a Letter of Formal 
Notice it is difficult to come to a clear conclusion but  in the case of a no deal, Ireland 
would be free to enter into bilateral negotiations relating to extradition but not to 
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109 See Arnell and Davies in this issue. 
replicate database access.  Other areas of potential bilateral agreement are possible 
but will be subject to a data adequacy agreement. Member States remain bound by 
GDPR and the law enforcement directive. Any bilateral agreement which related to the 
sharing of information would, considering the cases discussed above, fall under the 
purview of the CJEU. Any such agreement would be doomed without an adequacy 
agreement which demonstrates close alignment of the UK to EU data protection. In 
the event of a no deal an adequacy decision is therefore still very important. Without 
one there will be significant loss of data sharing as outlined above and this will be felt 
acutely by the PSNI in their working arrangements with AGS. A legal framework which 
enables the spontaneous sharing of information is vital for public safety across the 
Common Travel Area and must be a priority for the UK government in the event of a 
no deal.110 Any bilateral agreement should ensure that strong human rights protections 
are built in.111 
 
 
Creation of a joint operational centre  
 
Cooperation between UK and Ireland in policing and criminal matters has long 
predated membership of the EU and much cooperation between the two countries is 
outside of the EU framework.  Workshops held by the UK-Irish Criminal Justice 
Cooperation Network have revealed the extent of Brexit preparation by all criminal 
justice organisations in the UK and Ireland. The PSNI have a central academy for 
Brexit which is attempting to maximise existing structures and is making sure what 
currently exists works well, such as the cross-border agency taskforce. A recent 
example of a cooperative strategy can be seen in Operation Arbacia which worked to 
prevent planned attacks on police and prison officers in Northern Ireland in the run-up 
to the conclusion of the Brexit talks.  From the Irish perspective AGS have focused its 
Brexit preparations on examining existing structures and ensuring they work. They 
have encouraged better relations at a district level between those working in the border 
area.  Brexit has therefore not only created risks but also opportunities. It has 
increased the conversations about the international world, highlighted differences in 
legislation and approaches in the regions and overall relationships between the 
regions has improved as a result. Overall, there is more communication now between 
different agencies and relations between AGS and PSNI are better than they have 
ever been. However, there are external constraints. High level political rhetoric does 
not always transform into real forums where agencies can work on the issues that 
Brexit presents. No one can remove the fact that the border is deeply politically 
sensitive, and this can thwart progress.  
 
Members of the UK-Irish Criminal Justice Cooperation Network felt that focus should 
not just be on maintaining cross-border relationships but on enhancing them and this 
could be achieved by the creation of a permanently established joint operational centre 
involving key personnel from across the island of Ireland as well as relevant UK 
organisations such as the NCA. This could operate on a model seen between multi-
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agency hubs for UK joint intelligence and operations but on a cross-border level. The 
PSNI have suggested to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee that: 
With the provision of a suitable data adequacy position and the opportunity to take forward 
bilateral arrangements between UK and Ireland we believe there are significant opportunities 
to develop new approaches such as the provision of a bespoke centre of excellence relating to 
crime cooperation and coordination. Appropriate integration of operational and investigative 
collaboration across a range of agencies and remits would enhance existing capacity and 
capability based on the traditional collaborative “taskforce” model.112 
 
Such cooperation would work best if it had a legal basis. An example of highly 
functional police cooperation can be seen between the Nordic countries. Cooperation 
is based on formally signed international law instruments supplemented with 
intergovernmental protocols. Enhanced co-operation is premised on a shared history 
(not always harmonious), a common legal and policing culture and the removal of 
passport controls long before the advent of Schengen.  Cooperation is driven by the 
Nordic Council which is the official body for inter-parliamentary cooperation. 
Adherence to the rule of law and human rights principles underpin cooperation.113  
There are also models of cooperation between police in the South of England and 
France which, from a legal perspective, is ahead of what is available between the north 
and south of Ireland. The UK-France Coordination and Information Centre underpins 
cooperation between the UK and France. The centre’s legal basis comes from the 
Sandhurst Treaty.114 The UK should investigate with Ireland the appetite for agreeing 
a similar treaty and coordination centre with its own budget. Such a centre is more 
likely to succeed if under the remit of the British-Irish Council.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Brexit has resulted in political, economic and criminological risks that threaten the 
fragile stability of post-GFA Northern Ireland and ultimately could re-ignite inter-
communal divisions over its constitutional status within the UK. The history of the 
Troubles complicates police response to border crime. The UK government should not 
forget the potential impact its policies surrounding immigration and the movement of 
goods can have on crime across the Common Travel Area. Whilst the PSNI and AGS 
remain committed to cooperating closely to minimise exploitation of the border they 
cannot operate as a border service. Maintenance of an open border is an essential 
aspect of the Good Friday Agreement and organised criminals cannot be allowed to 
undermine this. The PSNI and AGS are moving into an era where cooperation will be 
more important than ever but at a time when the legal architecture under which 
cooperation (informal as well as formal) has flourished will be removed before 
replacement structures can be negotiated and implemented. Data protection concerns 
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in the event of a no deal or in the absence of an adequacy decision will quickly dry up 
information exchange. Even if the UK and the EU are to reach an agreement there will 
be new processes in place which many police officers and lawyers will have to 
familiarise themselves with. Legal challenges are likely to become more frequent. 
Cooperation between the PSNI and AGS has never been better and the desire to work 
together is palpable on both sides of the border but such goodwill cannot be a 
substitute for the necessary authorisation. Information will not be shared if there is no 
legal basis to do so. In the event of a no deal the UK needs to work quickly to secure 
a data adequacy agreement which is a prerequisite to many needed bilateral 
agreements. It should not be presumed that the political will needed for such 
agreements will be immediately forthcoming from Ireland. The sooner the UK and 
Ireland start working together the quicker any holes presented by a no deal Brexit can 
be plugged. Without this the lights will go out on 1 January 2020. 
 
Post Brexit the landscape will not be the same. At least some of the instruments that 
have been utilised to great effect over the last 20 years will not all be available. The 
UK and Ireland will therefore have to find alternative ways of ensuring that cooperation 
between the two countries continues to flourish. Culturally, economically, and 
politically these islands have been inextricably linked for centuries and Brexit should 
not alter this.   Network members were clear that the advent of GDPR and the Law 
Enforcement Directive mean that informal cooperation will be less effective than it has 
been in the past. A UK-EU security agreement is the optimal way of achieving this 
although in the event of no deal the UK and Ireland should pursue bilateral agreements 
where legally possible. Formalising police cooperation through legal instrument and 
establishing a joint operational centre offers a positive way forward. This is more likely 
to be successful if supplemented by high level forums for cooperation. What the UK 
negotiates with the EU about criminal justice cooperation both now and in the future 
uniquely impacts Northern Ireland. It is recommended that the remit of the British-Irish 
Council be expanded to include criminal justice cooperation. This would emulate the 
Nordic model which sees criminal justice cooperation driven by justice ministers in the 
Nordic Council115 despite four different types of relationship between its constituent 
members and the EU.116 ‘Keeping the lights on’ has always been the desired aim of 
the UK, the EU and Ireland but it is now time to ensure it becomes a reality. 
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